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Abstract
We use a life cycle model of consumption and portfolio choice to study the ef-
fects of social security on the investment decisions of households for the Euro-
pean case. Our model is mainly based on the one developed by Cocco, Gomes,
and Maenhout (2005). We extend it by unemployment risk using Markov chains
to model the transition between different employment states. In contrast to
most models in the life cycle literature, our model allows for three different
states, namely employment, short-term as well as long-term unemployment.
This allows us to examine the effects of persistence in the unemployment pro-
cess on portfolio choice. Our main ﬁndings are, ﬁrst, that in case of short-term
unemployment only, social security systems as those established in the EU are
able to offset the negative impact of unemployment risk on the portfolio-share
invested in risky assets. Second, the simulation results reveal that when allow-
ing for long-term unemployment the equity-share is suppressed, especially for
young investors. We show that this negative effect of unemployment is mainly
driven by its persistence.
Keywords: precautionary savings, unemployment insurance, long-term unem-
ployment, income uncertainty
JEL Classiﬁcation: D91, E21, H31
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1 Introduction
During the last decade ﬁnite horizon life cycle models have been intensively used
to study the optimal portfolio choice of individuals under different conditions. One
important ﬁeld of the literature has been dedicated to the optimal allocation of sav-
ings between riskless and risky assets over the life cycle. In a seminal study, Cocco
et al. (2005) employ a realistically calibrated life cycle model of consumption and
portfolio choice with non-tradable labor income and borrowing constraints where
the optimal share invested in equities is falling over life, since labor income consti-
tutes a substitute for riskless asset holdings. In early years of their life individuals
invest fully in stocks while in midlife saving for retirement becomes an important
behavioral factor - the optimal share of savings invested in stocks thus declines.
However, themodelingofso-calleddisastrouslaborincomeshocks, originallyintro-
duced by Carroll (1997) which feature zero income with a small probability changes
the results: it lowers the optimal share of risky assets especially for young agents. In
a recent article, Chai, Maurer, Mitchell, and Rogalla (2009) derive optimal life cycle
portfolio asset allocations for individuals who can choose their hours of work and
their retirement age endogenously. Moreover, investment opportunities do not only
include risky stocks and riskless bonds, but also survival-contingent payout annu-
ities. They ﬁnd, inter alia, that introducing annuities leads to earlier retirement and
higher participation rates in ﬁnancial markets by elderly agents.
Another strand of the literature is concerned with the analysis of social security
issues, e.g. unemployment insurance, in the life cycle framework. Imrohoroglu, Im-
rohoroglu, and Joines (1995) develop a general equilibrium model to examine the
welfare beneﬁts of unemployment insurance. They ﬁnd that an unfunded social se-
curity system is able to enhance economic welfare. On the other hand, Engen and
Gruber (2001) show a negative impact of unemployment insurance on asset accu-
mulation in a life cycle model and empirically conﬁrm this result in a panel study
for the US. However, these studies do not consider the optimal portfolio allocation
between risky assets and riskfree bonds.
In this paper, our goal is to bring the above mentioned studies together in order
to examine the portfolio implications of unemloyment insurance over the life cycle
in Europe. The setup is similar to Cocco et al. (2005) who consider the impact of
disastrous labor income shocks on the portfolio allocation between risky and risk-
free assets, e.g. government bonds. However, in the European context a disastrous
labor income shock in the sense of some zero income state is an unrealistic assump-
tion, given that highly developed social security systems are in place. At this point
we have to consider the key difference in the unemployment dynamics between the
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US and the EU. The data show that long-term unemployment plays a much more
important role in the EU than in the US, both in terms of the share of long-term un-
employment in relation to total unemployment (between 2000 and 2008 19 percent
of unemployed were long-term unemployed in the EU versus only 6 percent in the
US) and in terms of the average duration of unemployment (the average duration
of unemployment in the EU was 15.5 months versus 3 months in the US between
2000 and 2008). These empirical facts call for an explicit modeling of unemployment
persistence in the European context.
There are several reasons why it is relevant to study the effects of labor market
frictions and social security on portfolio choice for the European case. First, labor
market frictions as those present in Europe - especially the persistence of unemploy-
ment - are one candidate to explain portfolio holding patterns in Europe which are
characterized by relatively low fractions invested in risky assets when compared to
the US. Second, it is important to shed light on the role of the well developed Euro-
pean social security systems for the portfolio choice of households: Given that labor
income risk negatively inﬂuences the portfolio share invested in stocks, is social se-
curity in Europe able to completely offset these negative effects? And if not, why?
Or, does social security by itself crowd out investment in asset markets? Third, in-
dividual portfolio choice between risky and riskless assets allows households to
share consumption risks, to build up wealth and hence to smooth consumption
paths over life. In the presence of persistent unemployment, it is highly relevant
for policymakers to know how precautionary saving motives and preparedness for
retirement are affected. Fourth, the analysis of individual portfolio choice can be
used as a ﬁrst step to get an idea of aggregate tendencies. As we will see below,
our model shows that persistent unemployment decreases the equity-share in the
portfolio of young households whereas elderly households are less responsive to
unemployment risk. This may have far reaching implications for macroeconomic
performance and volatility. The lower share held in risky assets which is caused
by unemployment risk may lead to inefﬁciencies in ﬁnancial markets as ﬁrms may
have difﬁculties in ﬁnding investors who buy their stocks. Increased demand for
riskfree bonds can thus have important consequences for the efﬁcient functioning of
ﬁnancial markets and ﬁnally for long-term economic growth.
We use the life cycle framework presented in Cocco et al. (2005) and augment
it by unemployment risk where we allow for two different unemployment states:
ﬁrst, a state for short-term unemployment associated with a relatively high replace-
ment ratio, and second, a much more persistent state for long-term unemployment
with a low replacement ratio. Using this model, we theoretically study the impact of
unemployment insurance systems, i.e. different replacement ratios, and long-term
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unemployment on the portfolio choice of households in Europe. Our results with
unemployment risk are qualitatively similar to those including a small probability
of a disastrous labor income shock in Cocco et al. (2005), i.e. young agents reduce
the optimal share of risky assets in their portfolios. We show that the high expected
mean duration of the long-term unemployment state is essential for this result. As-
suming alternative unemployment dynamics where the distribution of different in-
come states is independent over time but nevertheless imposing the same uncondi-
tional distribution does not have any signiﬁcant impact on optimal portfolio choice.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the model
andsection3thecorrespondingoptimizationproblem. Thecalibrationandparametriza-
tion is presented in section 4. Section 5 will be devoted to the results: the ﬁrst sub-
section provides the model solution obtained by numerical methods, i.e. the policy
functions for three different setups, while the second subsection presents our sim-
ulation results based on these policy functions. Section 6 concludes and proposes
directions for future research.
2 The Model
Our model is mainly based on the life cycle framework with optimal consumption
and portfolio choice presented in Cocco et al. (2005). We extend it by introducing
unemployment risk which is modeled similar to that in Imrohoroglu et al. (1995).
The model describes a partial equilibrium where households are ex ante homoge-
neous, that is they have identical preferences and are subject to the same mortality
and labor income risks. Ex post, households differ with respect to age, employment
status and wealth. They choose consumption and the share invested in risky assets
endogenously, while labor supply and retirement age are assumed to be exogenous
in this setup.
2.1 Preferences
The economy is inhabited by a continuum of individuals who live for a maximum
of T periods, facing mortality risk in each period of life t. Let t = 1,...,T denote
adult age. Each individual works up to period K when she reaches retirement age.
K is assumed to be exogenous and deterministic. Individual i maximizes expected














where d is the subjective discount factor and pt reﬂects the conditional probability








which positively depends on consumption at age t, Ct, and g is the coefﬁcient of
relative risk aversion. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is given by 1/g.
2.2 Income
Individuals earn stochastic labor income during their working lifes. Since labor
income risk is not completely insurable against shocks, the model exhibits a certain
degree of market-incompleteness. As of retirement age K agents receive a constant
fraction of their last labor income in terms of retirement beneﬁts. Thus, labor income
is stable during the retirement phase.
2.2.1 Worker’s income
During professional life, individuals face a stochastic risk of getting unemployed.
We extend the standard case of two employment states - unemployment and em-
ployment - by a third state, thus allowing for a differentiation between short- and
long-term unemployment. Let s ∈ S = {e,us,ul} be the employment opportunities
state which is assumed to follow a ﬁrst-order Markov-chain. If s = e, the consumer
is offered the opportunity to work. Whenever an individual is given the opportu-
nity to work, he supplies labor inelastically. If s = uk,k = s,l the agent is short-term





,i, j = e,us,ul where each element pij = Prob{st+1 = j|st = i} reﬂects the proba-
bility that a particular state i is followed by state j so that
1By deﬁnition p1 = 1 and pt = 0 for t > T.











Let f(t,Zit) = ft be a deterministic function of age t and of a vector Zit contain-
ing other individual characteristics which reﬂects the age-dependent labor income





ftPtQt fort = 1,...,K−1 ifs = e
zk ft−tPt−t fort = 1,...,K−1 ifs = uk, k = s,l
(4)
where t is the duration of the unemployment state and zk is the beneﬁt replacement
ratio. In case the investor is unemployed, he receives a constant fraction zk of his
permanent labor income of the last period he worked in. Depending on the duration
of unemployment, the replacement ratio differs. When being jobless for a short
period of time only (k = s), agents receive higher beneﬁts as if they are long-term
unemployed (k = l). Going back to Hall and Mishkin (1982), labor income can be
decomposed into two components. On the one hand, Qt is a transitory shock to
labor income distributed as ln(Qt) ∼ N(−sq/2,sq) which mirrors temporary factors
like one-time bonuses or sickness beneﬁts. On the other hand, Pt is the permanent





Ut+1Pt fort = 1,...,K−1 ifs = e
Pt fort = 1,...,K−1 ifs = uk, k = s,l.
(5)
where Ut+1 is a log-normally distributed shock to the permanent component of la-
bor income with ln(Ut) ∼ N(−su/2,su). Permanent shocks to labor income are for
instance job changes, certain health problems or pay rises. The growth rate of the
age-speciﬁc deterministic component of labor income is given by Gt+1 = ft+1/ft if
the agent is given the working opportunity. Overall, labor income is a serially corre-
lated process subject to both temporary and permanent shocks as well as a positive
probability of getting unemployed in every period.
2.2.2 Income during retirement
Once agents have reached retirement age K, they receive funding from the social
security system. Similarly to unemployment beneﬁts, retirement income is deter-
ministic and modeled as a constant fraction l of permanent income earned in the
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last period of working life
Yt = l fK−1PK−1 fort = K,...,T (6)
implying that Gt =Ut = 1 during retirement.
2.3 Asset market
On capital markets, the individual can either invest in bonds, Bt, or in risky assets,
St. The riskless bond has a constant gross real return of Rf whereas stocks earn a
gross real return of Rt. Excess returns are composed of the mean return on equity, m,
plus a disturbance term h:
Rt −Rf = m +ht . (7)
The expectation of the excess return is given by the mean equity-premium E(Rt −
Rf) = m and the return on equity is assumed to be independently and identically
distributed as ln(Rt) ∼ N(ln(Rf +m)−sh/2,sh).
2.4 Budget constraint
Each period in his lifetime, the individual allocates his cash-on-hand, Mt, to bonds,






where At = Mt −Ct reﬂects assets after all transactions have been taken in period t
and can thus be interpreted as the agent’s savings. The variable at represents the
proportion of savings invested in stocks at time t.
3 Optimization problem
So far, we have two control variables, namely Ct and at together with the four state
variables Mt,Pt, ft and st. Given that our optimization problem is homogenous in Pt
and ft, we normalize it by these two variables, such that the state space is reduced
to two dimensions. For a detailed derivation see Appendix A. Deﬁning Xt
Pt ft = xt, the
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  (mt −ct)
Gt+1Ut+1
+yt+1 . (10)
Writing out the expectation over the employment state s explicitly, the individual’s













where he maximizes the recursive value function vt subject to the budget constraint
(10) and the non-negativity constraint at ≥ 0.
The levels of the value function, consumption and all other variables can be
obtained from
Vt(Mt,Pt, ft,st) = (Pt ft)1−gvt(mt,st) and (12)
Ct(Mt,st) = Pt ftct(mt,st) (13)
where we multiply the normalized functions with the appropriate income-factors as
in Carroll (2009).
Since there is no analytical solution to this ﬁnite-horizon maximization problem,
numerical methods have to be used to obtain the optimal policy functions ct(mt,st)
and at(mt,st). This is generally done by ﬁrst specifying a terminal decision rule and
then solving the problem by backward induction. Following Carroll (2006, 2009), we
discretizethestatespaceandcomputethevaluesofthepolicyfunctionsateachgrid-
point of possible values of the state variables mt and st. We then interpolate between
these discrete points of the functions ct and at in order to get an approximation
to the optimal decision rules. Having computed the interpolated policy functions
at time t, the corresponding value function can be determined. The solutions for
earlier periods are constructed by recursion from t = T to t = 1.
4 Calibration
We calibrate the model for the European context. If available, data for the EU27 are
used. The model period corresponds to one year.
Table 4 summarizes the parameter values that are used in our benchmark sim-
ulation. Individuals enter professional life at age 20 and live up to a maximum age
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of 100 years so that our model accounts for T = 81 years. We set average retirement
age to K = 62 according to Eurostat-data for 2008. The coeffcient of relative risk
aversion, g, is ﬁxed at the value of 10 following Cocco et al. (2005), the subjective
discount rate, d takes on a value of 0.96 which corresponds to an annual interest
rate of 4 percent. Following Cocco et al. (2005), we assume Rf, the real interest rate
on the riskless asset, to be 2 percent while the mean return on stocks, m, is set to 6
percent, hence implying an equity premium of 4 percent. The correlation between
equity returns and shocks to labor income, f, is set to zero as in Cocco et al. (2005).
According to OECD-data, the gross pension replacement rate of the median
earner, i.e. pension beneﬁts as a share of individual lifetime average earnings, was
65 percent in the EU in 2009 so that we set l = 0.65. Concerning the gross replace-
ment rate for unemployment beneﬁts, we refer to the OECD Employment Outlook
(2009) where the replacemet rate for those who are unemployed for a period up to
one year is zs = 0.60 whereas the replacemet rate drops to zl = 0.20 for individuals
who are long-term unemployed (ﬁve year unemployment spell).
Parameter Description Value
T life span (20 to 100) 81
K average retirement age 62
g coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion 10
d subjective discount factor 0.96
m mean return on equity (m −1) 0.06
s2
h volatility of equity log-return 0.152
Rf real riskless rate 1.02
s2
u standard deviation of shock to permanent labor earnings 0.0106
s2
q standard deviation of transitory shock to labor income 0.07
f correlation between stock returns and earning shocks 0
zs beneﬁt replacement rate (short term unemployment) 0.6
zl beneﬁt replacement rate (long term unemployment) 0.2
l beneﬁt replacement rate (retirement) 0.65
Table 1: Parameter values
The vector of conditional survival probabilities, pt, is computed from the mortal-
ity tables provided by the Human Mortality Database (http://www.mortality.
org). Conditional survival probabilities for the EU are proxied by the average of
the four largest EU-members’ rates, that is Germany, France, Italy, and Spain.
The transition probabilities for the Markov process are chosen such that the un-
conditional probabilities of being short-term and long-term unemployed match Eu-
ropean data. Taking into account that the average EU-unemployment rate between
2000 and 2008 was 8.5 percent with a share of long-term unemployment of roughly
20 percent of total unemployment, we calibrate the matrix P such that the uncon-
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ditional probability of being short-term unemployed amounts to 6.8 percent while
the corresponding probability for long-term unemployment is 1.7 percent. We de-
ﬁne short-term unemployment as a period of being without a job of up to one year
whereas long-term unemployment displays an average duration of six years in our
model. Controllingforbothunconditionalprobabilitiesaswellasforthepersistence











where we set peul = 0, because an individual gets short-term unemployed ﬁrst
before being counted as long-term unemployed and hence the state s = e cannot be
followed directly by the state s = ul. Moreover, once an individual is long-term un-
employedinourmodel, hecaneitherstayinthisstateorgetbacktowork. However,
in this setup it is not meaningful to switch from the state of long-term to short-term
unemployment and consequently we set the corresponding probability pulus equal
to zero, too.
For the scenario with two employment states only where s ∈ S = {e,us}, we ad-
just the transition matrix accordingly. Assuming a short-term unemployment rate







Concerning the deterministic part of the labor income process, ft, we use a simu-
lated function f(t,Zt) which is hump-shaped as described in Cocco et al. (2005) and
others. The calibration of this function for European household panel data is left for
further research.
5 Results
In the following, we split up our analysis into three scenarios. First, we have a look
at the policy functions and simulation results for the benchmark case where we ab-
stract from any unemployment risk. This benchmark case reproduces the results
presented in Cocco et al. (2005) for the European context. Secondly, we introduce
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unemployment risk, that is, the investor may ﬁnd herself in two different states in
each period of her working life. If s = e, she is given an employment opportunity.
If s = us, she is short-term unemployed. In this second scenario we consider two
subcases. First, only a minimum of insurance against unemployment is available
(z = 0.1). Second, we introduce unemployment insurance with an income replace-
ment ratio of z = 0.6 which is in line with European data.
Finally, we consider a third setup where the agent faces three possible employ-
ment states. Besides the two states s = e,us the agent faces the additional risk of
getting long-term unemployed, i.e. s = ul. In this scenario, we again differentiate
between two sub-cases: First, we do not consider the persistence of unemployment
but rather calibrate the transition matrix P such that the unconditional probabilities
of being short-term or long-term unemployed match European data. In this case,
we set the conditional probabilities equal to the unconditional ones, such that the
realizations of the possible states are independent over time. Put differently, the
realizations are random draws from the same unconditional distribution. Second,
we also take into account the average duration of being short-term or long-term
unemployed and hence the persistence component of unemployment.
The key results from our analysis are the following. In case of short-term unem-
ployment only (scenario 2), we show that unemployment insurance as established
in the EU helps to offset the increased labor income risk. The share invested in
stocks evolves thus very similarly to the benchmark case without unemployment
risk. Hence, the replacement ratio seems to be important for portfolio choice. How-
ever, if long-term unemployment is taken into account (scenario 3), we observe that
the equity-share is reduced even in the presence of unemployment insurance. This
drop is particularly important for young investors. Thus, the model shows that the
persistence of unemployment plays a key role in explaining low equity-shares in the
portfolio of young investors.
5.1 Policy functions
Inthissectionwediscussthepolicyfunctionfortheoptimalshareinvestedinstocks,
a(t,Mt), for different scenarios. The function a mirrors the optimal decision rule for
an investor of age t disposing of a certain amount of cash-on-hand Mt. We present
the policy functions for the share invested in stocks as contour plots for each sce-
nario studied. In each of the following graphs in this section, age t is plotted at
the vertical axis while the level of cash-on-hand, Mt, can be read off the horizontal
axis. The corresponding numerical values of the associated portfolio-share of stocks
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a(t,M) are indicated at the contour lines. The darker the area between the contour


































Figure 1: Contour lines for the equity-share, no unemployment risk
The contour plots can be read in the following way. Figure 1 illustrates the optimal
decision rule for the benchmark scenario where we abstract from any unemploy-
ment risk. For a given level of cash-on-hand (imagine a vertical line at M = 4 for
example), the contour lines show that the share invested in stocks falls from close
to one down to 0.63 until age 48 approximately. Afterwards, a increases somewhat
until retirement age K = 62 is reached. During the rest of her life, the investor con-
tinuously reduces her equity-share as she approaches end of life T.
Looking at the plot the other way around, let us ﬁx age at 40 for instance and
examinetheevolutionofa acrossdifferentlevelsofcash-on-hand. Thecontourlines
reveal that the equity-share is close to one up to M = 2.5. As M increases further, at
starts to descend, but at a diminishing rate as the contour lines lie farther away from
each other for higher levels of cash-on-hand.
5.1.1 Benchmark scenario: no unemployment risk
We now turn to the interpretation of the baseline scenario without any unemploy-
ment risk. This scenario closely resembles the one analyzed in Cocco et al. (2005).
However, we adjust the parameters to the European context.
Let us concentrate on the retirement period ﬁrst where labor income is modeled
under the simplifying assumption of being constant and certain. At any given age,
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the equity share decreases as cash-on-hand grows. The intuition for this observa-
tion can be explained as follows. Future retirement income (henceforth: RI) can be
understood as a substitute for riskless asset holdings. In other words, the stream of
future RI reﬂects implicit bond holdings in the individual’s asset portfolio. Agents
who dispose of little wealth buy more stocks, because their future retirement in-
come and hence their implicit risk-free asset positions are larger relative to their
wealth than for richer investors. Expressed in mathematical terms, the ratio of the
present discounted value of future retirement income to wealth,
PDV(RI)
Mt , is higher
for poor households than for richer ones.
For any given level of wealth Mt, the amount of future RI diminishes as the agent
ages. Hence, the investor demands a larger share of explicit risk-free assets in order
to compensate for the decrease in risk-free RI. As a consequence, the portfolio share
held in stocks gets smaller and smaller and ﬁnally approaches the complete markets






following Samuelson (1969) and Merton (1969). Plugging the above mentioned pa-
rameter values into equation (16), the equity-share amounts to roughly 20 percent
for an investor close to the end of his life.
Having described the evolution of the equity share during retirement, we now
turn to working life when labor income is stochastic. Holding age ﬁxed, ﬁgure 1 re-
veals that the optimal decision rule for the equity share is still decreasing in cash-on-
hand. Hence, stochastic labor income also seems to be a substitute for bonds rather
than stocks and thus acts as implicit bond holdings. This is due to the fact that the
shocks to the labor income stream are only weakly correlated with the disturbances
to equity returns as in Cocco et al. (2005). On the other hand, for any given level of
wealth Mt, the contour lines illustrate that during the ﬁrst part of professional life
(up to age 48 approximately), a falls and this happens at a slower pace for higher
levels of Mt. The reduction in the equity share can be explained by the fact that the
present value of future labor income is high during the ﬁrst years of adult life and
then diminishes eventually. As of that point, investors start to substitute for implicit
bond holdings by buying more bonds explicitly due to their precautionary savings
motive: on the one hand, they built up buffers in order to insure against negative
labor income shocks. On the other hand, investors accumulate wealth to prepare for
retirement when income falls to the constant fraction l of labor income, aiming at a
smooth consumption path over their whole life. As of age 48, the equity share be-
gins to rise again as investors know that they approach the retirement period where
12Unemployment and Portfolio Choice: Does Persistence Matter?
future RI will be certain. Moreover, they already have accumulated risk-free buffer
stocks in order to protect against negative labor income shocks.


















































































































































(d) Short-term unemployment, insurance
Figure 2: Contour lines for the equity-share for s ∈ S{e,us}
Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show the contour lines for the scenario with unemployment
risk but only very basic insurance with a replacement ratio of 10 percent. In com-
parison to the baseline scenario without unemployment risk the following patterns
appear. For high values of wealth and starting at age 30 approximately, the contour
plots for the optimal share invested in stocks behave similarly to those in the bench-
mark scenario. Unemployment risk mainly affects young investors. In case of being
employed (ﬁgure 2(a)), the equity share is lower for given Mt than without unem-
ployment risk. This tendency is ampliﬁed in case of being unemployed (ﬁgure 2(b))
where the share invested in stocks is lower (i) during the whole working life for
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poor investors disposing of low levels of cash-on-hand only and (ii) for any given
level of Mt compared to a situation where the agent is in employment. The small
share invested in stocks by young investors, especially when being unemployed,
results from the fact that young individuals start out with low levels of labor in-
come. When being unemployed, they only get very basic beneﬁts. Consequently,
they invest a signiﬁcant share of their (small amount of) savings in bonds in order
to substitute for missing implicit risk-free asset holdings from labor income. Dur-
ing their last years in the labor force, agents quickly increase equity-shares as they
approach constant and certain retirement income.
Holding age ﬁxed, the optimal share invested in stocks starts out at a low level
for young investors. As Mt increases over life, the equity-share increases and then
decreases again. The rise in a kicks in at higher levels of cash-on-hand the younger
the investor is, especially if being jobless. If a young person is unemployed, she only
invests in risky assets if she is rich. Once the investor has reached midlife, she has
already accumulated a certain amount of buffer stock savings, so that even at low
levels of cash-on-hand she is able to invest more in stocks than a younger person.
Havingdiscussedtheeffectsofunemploymentriskontheoptimaldecisionrules
a(t,Mt) in absence of unemployment insurance, let us now introduce unemploy-
ment insurance with a replacement ratio of 60 percent as in the EU. Figure 2(c)
and 2(d) show the contour lines for a(t,Mt) with insurance for the employment and
short-term unemployment state, respectively. When comparing with ﬁgure 1, it can
be observed that the optimal policy rules are very similar to the benchmark case
without any risk of getting unemployed. If the agent is jobless, ﬁgure 2(d) reveals
that the optimal share invested in stocks is somewhat below the optimal share in
the benchmark scenario and in the employment state. However, the negative effect
of unemployment risk seems to be mainly absorbed if social security systems with
relatively high replacement ratios are in place as is the case in the EU.
5.1.3 Scenario3: short-termandlong-termunemploymentwithandwithoutper-
sistence
We now extend the framework by one additional feature, namely the risk of getting
not only short-term, but also long-term unemployed. To this end, we use the transi-
tion matrix P which has been calibrated to European data as described in section 4.
That is, we take the unconditional probabilities of getting short-term and long-term
unemployed into account and also consider the persistence of the different employ-
ment states as reﬂected by average durations.



































































































(c) Long-term unemployment (s = ul)
Figure 3: Contour lines for the equity-share, persistent long-term unemployment
Figure 3 illustrates the optimal policy functions a(t,Mt) for the three employment
states s = e,us,ul allowing for persistence in the unemployment process. It can be
observed that, in all three subﬁgures, the portfolio share invested in stocks is de-
pressed when comparing the policy functions to the benchmark case. Apart from
very low levels of cash-on-hand Mt, the equity-share lies below the one in the base-
line scenario for a given level of wealth. This tendency is reinforced going from the
employment over the short-term unemployment to the long-term unemployment
state. Especially for those individuals who are close to retirement age and endowed
with very little cash-on-hand the optimal equity-share is signiﬁcantly reduced. Not
surprisingly, the picture is especially pronounced in the long-term unemployment
state (ﬁgure 3(c)) where the optimal equity share is heavily downsized. At age 40
and for a given level of wealth of Mt = 4, for instance, the optimal share invested
in stocks drops to about 35 percent in case of long-term unemployment whereas if
being short-term unemployed, the corresponding share amounts to roughly 55 per-
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cent. Hence, the risk of being jobless for an extended period of time is crucial for the





















































































(c) Long-term unemployment (s = ul)
Figure 4: Contour lines for the equity-share, no persistence
In order to further analyze the factors that are responsible for the negative effect
of unemployment risk on the equity-share chosen by households, we change the
transition matrix P such that the unconditional probabilities of being in one of the
three employment states are still calibrated as before. However, we abstract from
the persistence component of unemployment by equalizing conditional and uncon-
ditional probabilities. Consequently, the employment states do not mirror the actual
autocorrelation displayed in the data. The resulting policy functions for the equity
share a are presented in ﬁgure 4. It can be observed that without persistence the
policy functions look qualitatively very similar to the benchmark scenario without
unemployment risk apart from those for the long-term unemployment state where
we have a non-monotone area at very low levels of cash-on-hand.
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Summing up, the following key features can be deducted from ﬁgures 1 to 4.
In all three scenarios, for a given level of cash-on-hand the equity share decreases
during retirement as t approaches the ﬁnal period T. The higher the value of M, the
lower the speed of the fall in at, since the reduction in future retirement income is
relatively less important for wealthy agents than for poorer ones.
During the working period, at decreases in Mt in the majority of cases, except for
theunemploymentstateinscenario2andthelong-rununemploymentstatewithout
persistence in scenario 3 where we observe non-monotone behavior for low levels
of wealth. Overall, the higher labor income risk - either presented by low unem-
ployment beneﬁts or by the risk of being long-term unemployed - the lower is the
share invested in risky assets, particularly by young investors. Thus, we can state
that labor income risk crowds out capital market risk for this age group. Finally, we
ﬁnd that the optimal portfolio share invested in stocks ﬁrst decreases in the majority
of cases until age 48 and then rises again towards retirement age. We will see in the
next section that our simulation results also show this pattern when averaging the
evolution of the equity-share over the life cycle for a large number of investors.
5.2 Simulation results
We simulate our model 10,000 times applying the Monte Carlo method and average
over the 10,000 simulated investors to compute the representative evolution of the
share invested in stocks over the life cycle. The following section starts with the
baseline scenario without any unemployment risk. Afterwards, we will discuss the
simulation results for the scenarios including short-term and long-term unemploy-
ment.
5.2.1 Benchmark scenario: no unemployment risk
Figure 5 shows the evolution of consumption, income, and cash-on-hand over the
life cycle for our baseline scenario. The graph closely matches the results presented
in Cocco et al. (2005). Income is slightly hump-shaped during working life, reaching
its maximum at about age 48. A kink can be observed at average retirement age
K = 62 when income drops to the fraction l of the last labor income. Afterwards,
during retirement, income is constant, as we impose the simplifying assumption
that there are neither temporary nor permanent disturbances to retirement beneﬁts.
Consumption follows a smooth path which closely matches income. A slight in-
crease in consumption can be observed even after retirement age. When approach-
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ing the end of life, consumption slightly falls as wealth erodes quickly. Cash-on-
hand strongly increases during the ﬁrst years of adult age due to the high growth
rates of deterministic labor income. At about age 48, wealth is accumulated at a
somewhat lower speed until the agent leaves the labor force. Once the retirement
period starts, wealth is run down rapidly and at an increasing rate the closer the
agent gets to the end of life. This is mainly due to mortality-enhanced impatience
given that we abstract from bequest motives.
Consumption, income and wealth evolve very similarly for all scenarios studied
here. That is why we only present the graphs once. The only difference which
appears is that wealth peaks at a somewhat lower level in case of no unemployment
insurance (scenario 2) and long-term persistent unemployment (scenario 3).














Figure 5: Simulation results for consumption, income and wealth, benchmark
Figure 6 plots the share invested in stocks for the benchmark scenario without un-
employment together with the graphs for scenario 2 where short-term unemploy-
ment is introduced. The solid line represents the benchmark scenario. The graph
shows that during the ﬁrst years of professional life, all savings are invested in
stocks. This results from the fact that the deterministic labor income proﬁle is very
steep during the ﬁrst ten years of adult life while the level of wealth, Mt, is still low.
Given that labor income acts as a substitute for riskless asset holdings, young in-
vestors’ portfolio share held in stocks is elevated, because the ratio of the expected
discounted future stream of labor income to wealth,
PDV(LI)
Mt , is consequently very
high.
After the ﬁrst ten years of working life, the asset share falls until age 55 approxi-
mately as investors demand more and more bonds during midlife in order to assem-
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ble savings for the retirement period. Put differently, the present discounted value
of future labor income decreases as the investor ages - on the one hand because the
future income stream shortens, on the other hand because the age-dependent com-
ponent of labor income gets ﬂatter and eventually falls - whereas the stock of cash-
on-hand grows, leading to a decrease in the ratio
PDV(LI)
Mt of the two variables. Just
before age 62, the portfolio share invested in stocks slightly increases again, since
agents know that retirement beneﬁts will be constant and deterministic. Approach-
ing the end of life, the equity-share rises again. This can be attributed to the fact that
wealth erodes at a faster rate than the present discounted value of future retirement
income does just before the end of life. Thus, even though the share invested in
stocks shifts in with age during this period, the net effect on at is positive.
5.2.2 Scenario 2: short-term unemployment with and without unemployment
insurance
While there was no unemployment risk in the benchmark scenario, we now intro-
duce two employment states, namely s ∈ S = {e,us}. First, let us look at a situation
where there is only very rudimentary unemployment insurance available with a re-
placement ratio z = 0.1. Hence, investors’ labor income is now subject to a much
higher risk. The dashed line in ﬁgure 6 reveals that under these circumstances, the
evolution of the equity share signiﬁcantly changes for young investors: it lies below
0.7 at the beginning of working life compared to a value of nearly one in the bench-
mark scenario. The share invested in risky assets sharply rises until age 30 before it
starts falling again and comes back to normal at age 35. For the remaining life-time,
the curve closely matches the one associated with the benchmark scenario, given
that older investors already have accumulated precautionary savings and a certain
stock of wealth in earlier years so that they are less affected by unemployment risk
than younger investors. Overall, the qualitative results of the benchmark scenario
are preserved with decreasing equity-shares for older investors.
Once unemployment insurance is introduced with a replacement ratio of z =0.6
in line with European data, the dotted line in ﬁgure 6 reveals that we are basi-
cally back to the benchmark scenario with high stock-shares for young investors
and lower ones for older individuals. Thus, the replacement ratio seems to be of
vital importance for the investment decision of households facing a certain degree
of unemployment risk. The results point out that the consequences of short-term
unemployment for the portfolio-share held in risky assets can be compensated by a
sufﬁcient level of unemployment insurance in our model.
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In the third scenario, we allow for three different employment states adding the
possibility of being long-term unemployed. When an individual is short-term un-
employed meaning that he is out of work for at most one year he receives 60 percent
of his last income. Once he is unemployed for more that one year, he is consid-
ered being long-term unemployed and the beneﬁt replacement ratio reduces to 20
percent. In the following, we distinguish two setups. First, we take the transition
matrix P which accounts for both the unconditional probabilities and the average
duration of unemployment in line with the stilized facts for the EU. Second, we use
P such that only the unconditional probabilities are taken into account whereas we
eliminate the persistence of the three possible employment states, thus abstracting
from actual autocorrelation in the employment process.
From ﬁgure 7 it can be seen that if the Markov-chain for the employment state is
calibrated realistically (dotted line), that is including both unconditional probabili-
tiesandpersistence, theportfolio-shareinvestedinriskyassetsissigniﬁcantlybelow
what we observe in the benchmark case (solid line). As before, the cohort of young
investors is mainly affected by the risk of getting long-term unemployed. Until the
age of 40, agents invest considerably less in stocks when confronted with the risk of
getting short-term and long-term unemployed. Hence, even a quite generous social
security system as the one established in Europe is unable to offset the risks asso-
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ciated with long-term unemployment and cannot avoid that young to middle-aged
individuals signiﬁcantly reduce their portfolio-shares held in risky assets.
The dashed line in ﬁgure 7 points to the key mechanism driving our results.
Onceweabstractfromthepersistenceofunemployment, theevolutionoftheequity-
share closely matches its path in the baseline scenario. We can thus conclude that the
persistence component of unemployment is crucial for the investment decision of
households; the autocorrelation of the unemployment states thus suppresses young
workers’ portfolio share invested in stocks.














Figure 7: Simulation results for the equity-share, with and without persistence
6 Conclusion and Future Research
The goal of this paper has been to investigate the impact of social security systems
on the investment decisions of households in the European context. To this end, we
have used a calibrated life cycle model of consumption and portfolio choice which
features unemployment risk. As opposed to most models in the life cycle literature,
we allow for three employment states: besides the possibility of being employed or
unemployed, we extend the state-space by explicitly differentiating between short-
term and long-term unemployment. This extension is motivated by the fact that
long-term unemployment plays an important role in describing the dynamics of
European labor markets.
Our main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. When considering employ-
ment and short-term unemployment only, we theoretically show that social security
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systems with income replacement ratios as those established in the EU are able to
countervail the negative impact of unemployment risk on the portfolio share in-
vested in risky assets. Consequently, under these circumstances investors choose
their equity-shares as if there were no risk of loosing jobs. Yet, the picture changes
when taking long-term unemployment into account. In this case, even if social se-
curity systems help to insure against part of the increased labor income risk, the
equity-share in the portfolio of young investors is signiﬁcantly reduced due to en-
hanced precautionary savings. We show that this outcome is predominantly driven
by the persistence of unemployment.
There are several tasks that are worth being treated in future research. As stated
in section 4, we have so far taken a simulated hump-shaped function for the deter-
ministic part of labor income f(t,Zit) from Cocco et al. (2005). Since it is not granted
that the age-dependent component of labor income evolves in the same way in Eu-
rope as it does in the US, we are going to estimate the function ft as well as the error
structure of the labor income process and its correlation with stock market returns
for the European case using household panel data. The data could also be used to
empirically study the effects of social security and the persistence of unemployment
on the portfolio decisions of European households.
Another point that should be addressed in the future concerns labor supply
which is exogenous in the current version of the model. Labor hours supplied could
be made endogenous as in Chai et al. (2009). Being able to adjust their hours worked
in response to income uncertainty would provide agents with an alternative means
of tackling labor income risk. Consequently, individuals’ behavior would be much
closer to reality if they were able to ﬂexibly adjust labor supply and hence their
implicit bond-holdings. Moreover, retirement income could be modeled more re-
alistically by relaxing the assumption of constant pension income as well as taking
average lifetime working income as a basis for pension beneﬁts. Making retirement
income uncertain would allow us to assess the change in the precautionary and re-
tirement savings motives during professional life which should get more important
as agents have to insure against negative shocks that hit when being pensionary. Be-
yond that, the dynamics of the equity-share which are so far very simplistic during
the retirement phase would be actualized when introducing additional uncertainty.
Finally, it could be interesting to embed our model into a general equilibrium
setup where the ﬁrm side is explicitly modeled. In such a framework the impact
of ﬁrm’s labor demand and the effects of the correlation between labor and capital
income on the portfolio choice of households could be analyzed.
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A Appendix
Abstracting from the state variable st for the moment, we normalize the optimiza-
tion problem with Pt and ft in the following way.
























  (mt −ct)
Gt+1Ut+1
+yt+1 (18)
whereUt is the stochastic growth rate of permanent labor income and Gt reﬂects the
growth rate of the deterministic part of the labor income process, ft. Normalized
labor income yt is given by
yt =

   
   
Qt fort = 1,...,K−1ifs = e
zk fort = 1,...,K−1ifs = ukk = s,l
l fort = K,...,T.
(19)
In a second step, we setup the Bellman equation for the consumer’s optimiza-
tion problem in the next-to-last period of life, abstracting for the moment from the
employment state st. The consumer maximizes utility subject to equations (2)-(8)
choosing CT−1 and aT−1:
VT−1(MT−1,PT−1, fT−1) = max
CT−1,aT−1
{u(CT−1)+dpT−1ET−1VT(MT,PT, fT)} . (20)
Given that the consumer will die at the end of period T, she will consume all cash-
on-hand implying that MT =CT and hence











Now, let us expand equation (21) by Pt ft in order to express it in lower case letters

























      
=vT−1(mT−1)
so that we ﬁnally have
VT−1(MT−1,PT−1, fT−1) = (PT−1fT−1)1−gvT−1(mT−1) . (22)
The same logic can be applied for all earlier periods t = 1,...,T −2.
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